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Chairman Baucus, Ranking Member Grassley, and distinguished members of the
Committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you about S. 970, the Iran
Counter-Proliferation Act of 2007. In this testimony I will discuss the following: the
grave threat posed to the United States by Iran’s nuclear program, the current status of
Iran’s nuclear program, two examples of how strong sanctions have previously stopped
illicit nuclear weapons programs, Iran’s vulnerability to sanctions and the current status
of those sanctions, and how S. 970 can contribute to increasing the prospects for
preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

I.

The Grave Threat Posed to the United States by Iran’s Nuclear Program

Iran’s nuclear program is a grave security concern. It is also a grave economic
concern. Armed only with boxcutters, the nineteen al Qaeda hijackers on September 11,
2001 killed almost 3,000 people and caused tens of billions of dollars in damage to New
York City, the Pentagon, and the global economy.1 This toll would be dwarfed by a
“nuclear 9/11.” Detonation of a single small, crude nuclear weapon in a city such as New
York or Washington, DC could kill more than 500,000 people and cause over one trillion
dollars in damage.2 Such a “nuclear 9/11” attack on America within the next decade is
“more likely than not” according to nuclear nonproliferation experts including Graham
Allison3 and Robert Gallucci.4 The odds of such a devastating “nuclear 9/11” attack on
Tel Aviv may be as high or higher.
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Where would such a bomb most likely come from? Iran. The Iranian regime’s
apocalyptic messianism and exaltation of martyrdom may make it impossible to deter
Iran from using, or enabling its terrorist proxies to use, nuclear weapons to achieve its
avowed aims of destroying the United States and Israel.5 While mutual deterrence kept
the United States and the Soviet Union from attacking each other during the Cold War,
significant elements of Iran’s leadership may be undeterrable.6 There would also be a
considerable risk of rogue elements within Iran taking it upon themselves to transfer
nuclear arms to Iran’s terrorist allies. As we saw with Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan, who
proliferated under the comparatively secular and responsible Musharraf government, one
key rogue figure can be sufficient to share an insecure country’s nuclear technology with
others.
However, even before Iran launches a nuclear attack, and indeed even if it never
does, an Iranian nuclear arsenal will make Iran far more dangerous than it is today. The
current Iranian government is already the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism.7 An
Iranian nuclear arsenal would serve Iran as a “nuclear umbrella,” making countries
victimized by Iranian-sponsored terrorism even more reluctant to retaliate against Iran.
This would likely make Iran an even more self-confident sponsor of terrorism.
Another danger of Iran acquiring a nuclear arsenal is that many of its neighbors in
the Middle East would feel compelled to follow suit. The fear that an Iranian nuclear
arsenal will unleash a cascade of proliferation across the Middle East has been
heightened by several Arab states beginning in response to accelerate their efforts to
acquire nuclear technology.8 An editorial in the Egyptian government daily newspaper
Al-Ahram put it as follows: “Iran’s nuclear capability . . . will spur many powers in the
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region to develop a nuclear program.”9 Such a cascade of proliferation in the Middle East
would likely lead to the worldwide collapse of the already tottering nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) regime.10 In addition, the proliferation of nuclear weapons in
the Middle East tinderbox, with its border disputes, religious fanaticism, ethnic hatreds,
unstable governments, terrorist groups, and tendency for conflicts to spiral out of control,
seems likely to result in a nuclear war that would be exceedingly costly in both human
life and economic terms.

II.

Current Status of Iran’s Nuclear Program

The international community has thus far responded with remarkable passivity to
the grave dangers posed by the Iranian nuclear program. As a result, there is at present
nothing but time standing between the Iranian regime and a nuclear arsenal.
Two weeks ago, I addressed a seminar in Vienna, Austria at which leading nuclear
nonproliferation experts and senior representatives to the International Atomic Energy
Agency from countries including the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom,
Germany, and Sweden came together, under the aegis of two non-governmental
organizations, for a discussion of possible compromise resolutions to the dispute over
Iran’s nuclear program. Some of the proposals presented, such as one developed by two
experts from MIT, would involve far-reaching concessions to Iran. The Iranians were
also invited to participate in the seminar. They sent two junior staffers who simply took
notes and said nothing. There seemed to me to be a very grim sense among the Western
(and even the Russian) participants, a sense that it is clear sailing ahead for the Iranian
nuclear program, with the rest of the world having insufficient leverage to get the Iranians
to stop their prohibited enrichment program or even perhaps to get the Iranians to agree
to a proposal, such as some of those floated in Vienna, that would involve far-reaching
concessions to Iran and relatively few concessions by Iran.
This grim sense is borne out by both developments on the ground in Iran and
Iranian President Ahmedinejad’s consistently uncompromising rhetoric.
The United Nations Security Council, in three Security Council Resolutions
including Resolution 1737 of December 2006, has issued an order, binding under
international law, that “Iran shall without further delay suspend” various “proliferation
sensitive nuclear activities” including “all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities,
including research and development” and “work on all heavy water-related projects,
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including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water.”11 Rather
than comply with this legally binding Security Council mandate to cease the production
of nuclear fuel by enrichment and other methods, Iran has openly and admittedly
accelerated its enrichment activities. On April 9, 2007, exactly one year ago tomorrow,
Iranian President Ahmadinejad announced, in a ceremony accompanied by chants of
“death to America,” that Iran had made a dramatic leap forward in its nuclear program by
beginning to enrich uranium on an industrial scale.12 In November 2007, Ahmadinejad
announced that Iran was operating 3,000 uranium-enriching centrifuges.13 Both steps are
explicitly prohibited by Security Council Resolution 1737. In recent days, Iran has
reportedly responded to Security Council Resolution 1803 of March 3, 2008 -- the latest
reminder from the Council of Iran’s legal obligation to suspend all enrichment related
activities – with the installation of 300 additional uranium-enriching centrifuges,
including some that are more advanced than those Iran already had in operation.14 The
additional centrifuges were reportedly installed to comply with a directive from President
Ahmadinejad that a significant nuclear achievement be displayed on April 8, today, a
date Iran has marked as National Nuclear Technology Day.15
As Iran’s enrichment-related and other nuclear activities have progressed,
President Ahmadinejad and other Iranian officials have consistently declared that they are
not interested in negotiations over their nuclear activities. For example, less than a week
ago, President Ahmadinejad said that he would reject any new incentives offered by the
international community in return for suspending uranium enrichment. Ahmadinejad
was quoted as telling Japan’s Kyodo News Agency: “This is a non-negotiable subject.
Iran is a nuclear country and has no reason to give up the technology.”16
We all know that the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in December 2007
concluded that Iran had halted nuclear weaponization research in 2003 and probably had
not restarted it as of the middle of 2007. For the following reasons, that NIE conclusion
should give us little comfort and must not dissuade us from ramping up sanctions
pressure on Iran:
•

Leading U.S. intelligence officials have recently been stepping back from that
conclusion. For example, CIA Director Michael V. Hayden said on March 30:
“Why would the Iranians be willing to pay the international tariff they appear to
be willing to pay for what they are doing now if they did not have, at a minimum .
. . the desire to keep the option open to develop a nuclear weapon and, perhaps
even more so, that they have already decided to do that?”17 Director of National
Intelligence Michael McConnell testified on February 5 before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence that Iran could have restarted work on a nuclear
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warhead without U.S. intelligence officials being aware of it, testifying of Iran’s
nuclear weapons design program that “We assess with moderate confidence that
Tehran had not restarted these activities as of mid-2007, but since they comprised
an unannounced secret effort which Iran attempted to hide, we do not know if
these activities have been restarted.”18 McConnell also said of the NIE during his
testimony that, "In retrospect, as I mentioned, I would do some things
differently."19 On February 26, McConnell told a radio interviewer, “Our estimate
is they intend to have a nuclear weapon.”20
•

Our leading European allies assert that Iran intends to acquire nuclear weapons.
For example, after the NIE was issued, France’s President, Nicolas Sarkozy, said,
“Notwithstanding the latest elements, everyone is fully conscious of the fact that
there is a will among the Iranian leaders to obtain nuclear weapons.” “I don’t see
what we should renounce sanctions, Sarkozy added. “What made Iran budge so
far has been sanctions and firmness.” 21 Britain’s Ambassador to the United
Nations stated in February that “the NIE gave a rather, if I may put it this way,
some false reassurance about Iranian intentions.”22

•

While designing and manufacturing a warhead is obviously a critical element of
developing a nuclear weapon, it is also the least technically difficult and least
time-consuming of the three critical elements. Iran is openly proceeding with the
other two critical elements: producing fissile material (enriched uranium or
plutonium) to fuel a bomb and producing a delivery system (such as a missile
warhead). Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell testified in
February that nuclear weapons design is “probably the least significant part” of
Iran’s nuclear weapons program23 and that Iran could “probably” produce enough
fissile material for a nuclear weapon by as early as 2010.24 Iran’s missile
program is sufficiently advanced that its Shihab missiles are already capable of
striking Europe.25 Even if the NIE was correct in its assessment that Iran halted
its weaponization program in 2003 and has not resumed it, this would have
relatively little impact on the length of time it would take Iran to field a nuclear
weapon once it has produced fissile material and a delivery system. Assuming
Iran had not already accomplished most of the steps needed for weaponization by
the time it took a break in 2003, it would still take less than a year – based on the
plans Iran is known to possess – to assemble a workable bomb, fuel it with fissile
material, and mount it on a delivery system.
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III.

•

The February 22, 2008 IAEA report on Iran included information about Iranian
explosives testing and development activities “which the Agency believes would
be relevant to nuclear weapon weapon R&D” and Iranian work on modifications
to the Shihab-3 missile which would make it “quite likely to be able to
accommodate a nuclear device.”26 The IAEA report urged Iran to be more
forthcoming in response to this information, which the report said was “a matter
of serious concern and critical to an assessment of a possible military dimension
to Iran’s nuclear programme.”27

•

On February 25, IAEA Deputy Director Olli Heinonen presented to diplomats
evidence of sophisticated research by Iran that Heinonen said was “not consistent
with any application other than the development of a nuclear weapon.”28 The
evidence, which includes a video showing work done on designing a nuclear
warhead capable of fitting atop Iran’s Shihab-3 missile,29 suggests that Iran’s
nuclear weaponization work continued for at least some time after the NIE said it
was suspended.30

Examples of Strong Sanctions Stopping Illicit Nuclear Weapons Programs

The sanctions imposed on Iran thus far – including by the United Nations Security
Council, the European Union and the United States – have obviously thus far failed to
dissuade Iran from continuing to pursue its nuclear program. It could be tempting to
conclude from this experience that sanctions can under no circumstances succeed in
stopping Iran’s nuclear weapons program. Such a conclusion would be both unfortunate
and incorrect.
The international community has learned in recent years that strong sanctions can
stop both illicit nuclear weapons programs and terrorism. For example, it was
discovered, in the wake of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, that strong U.N. Security Council
sanctions had destroyed Iraq’s nuclear weapons program and succeeded in preventing
Saddam Hussein from restarting it between the Gulf War in 1991 and the coalition
occupation of Iraq in 2003.31 The sanctions helped discourage Saddam from rebuilding
his nuclear weapons program, contained his ability to rebuild it by blocking the import of
key materials and technologies, and provided the UN with critical leverage to ensure Iraqi
26
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cooperation with UN inspections and monitoring.32 Rolf Ekeus, chief UN weapons
inspector in Iraq from 1991 to 1997, put it as follows: “Keeping the sanctions was the
stick, and the carrot was that if Iraq cooperated with the elimination of its weapons of
mass destruction, the Security Council would lift the sanctions. Sanctions were the
backing for the inspections, and they were what sustained my operation almost for the
whole time.”33
Strong UN Security Council sanctions also induced Libya’s government, a regime
that had become synonymous with international terrorism, to forsake terrorism and
completely and verifiably relinquish its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons
programs. Libya ceased its support for terrorism following the Security Council’s
imposition on it of strong sanctions in 1992 and 1993.34 In exchange for removal of the
Security Council sanctions, Libya, in August 2003, formally accepted responsibility for
the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 and paid $2.7 billion in compensation to its victims.35
In addition, Libya announced on December 19, 2003, that it had decided “to get rid of
[weapons of mass destruction] materials, equipment and programs, and to become totally
free of internationally banned weapons.”36 Libya proceeded to allow a team of British
and American government experts to enter the country and completely dismantle its
WMD infrastructure by April 2004.37
The sanctions on Libya both contained Qaddafi’s ability to develop WMD and
ultimately coerced Qaddafi, including by threatening his grip on Libya. The
sanctions’ impact on Libya’s ability to purchase replacement parts for its most
sophisticated machinery crippled the Libyan air force38 and eventually ground down
Libya’s petroleum extraction industry.39 Production by Libya’s oil industry declined from
a peak of 3.3 million barrels a day in the late 1970s to 1.1 million in 1999.40 The World
Bank estimated that the UN sanctions cost Libya eighteen billion dollars in oil revenue,41
and during this period the Libyan economy entered a long recession, resulting in thirtypercent unemployment and a fifty-percent inflation rate.42 The Qaddafi regime, which
“depended for its survival on buying the population’s acquiescence,” became the target of
demonstrations, “at least two military coup attempts and an Islamic insurgency.”43 As
with Iraq, the sanctions also reduced Libya’s ability to develop WMD, including by
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making the process more time-consuming and forcing Libya to import “shoddy
merchandise at exorbitant prices.”44

IV.

The Current Sanctions on Iran

The sanctions imposed on Iran by the international community thus far are much
weaker than the sanctions which stopped the Iraqi and Libyan nuclear weapons programs.
Security Council Resolution 687 of April 1991 imposed comprehensive economic
sanctions on Iraq. Security Council Resolutions 731 and 748 of 1992 and Resolution
883 of 1993 imposed with respect to Libya mandatory sanctions including a ban on
flights destined for or originating in Libya; a ban on the supply of aircraft, aircraft parts,
or servicing to Libya; an arms embargo; a freeze on various Libyan assets abroad; and a
prohibition on the export to Libya of oil pumping, transport, and refining equipment. In
contrast, the mandatory sanctions imposed with respect to Iran by Security Council
Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803 include merely 1) restrictions on the export to Iran of
certain specified nuclear and ballistic missile items, materials, equipment and technology;
2) a freeze of overseas assets of various named Iranian officials and institutions; 3) a ban
on the export of arms by Iran; and 4) a ban on overseas travel of a handful of Iranian
officials.
Due to its ideology, the value to the Iranian regime of engaging in nuclear
proliferation and sponsoring terrorism is particularly high. Yet, the price the international
community has exacted from the Iranian regime for its violations has thus far been
remarkably low. Security Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803 are too weak to
coerce Iran into compliance, contain Iran’s ability to advance its nuclear weapons
program, or deter other states from following Iran’s lead and developing their own
nuclear weapons program. This is unfortunate, because Iran’s heavy dependence on
foreign trade leaves it highly vulnerable to strong economic sanctions. For example, Iran
depends on other countries to refine forty percent of the gasoline it needs for internal
consumption.45 Notwithstanding its oil wealth, Iran’s economy has been so mismanaged
that the living standard of the average Iranian today is lower than it was at the time of the
Islamic Revolution in 1979.46 Inflation in Iran is at nineteen percent and over twenty
percent of Iranian young people are unemployed.47 Many Iranians have strongly
criticized the Iranian government for endangering its economy and international
relationships over the nuclear issue, and sanctions-induced further weakening of the
Iranian economy could strengthen the hands of these opposition figures.
Why are the Security Council sanctions on Iran so weak? In considerable part
because Russia and China, which have vetoes over Security Council sanctions, are
prioritizing the short-term profits to be gained from business as usual over the long-term
security to be gained by forcing Iran to stop before it succeeds in developing nuclear
44
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weapons. Indeed, the weakness of the sanctions imposed by the Security Council stands
in stark contrast to major Russian and Chinese transactions with Iran that were unaffected
by the sanctions and thus represent leverage lost. For example, Russia was, at the very
time of the vote on Resolution 1737, in the process of delivering to Iran 29 Tor-M1 antiaircraft missile systems purchased by Iran for $1.4 billion dollars. 48 The anti-aircraft
systems are, by the way, being stationed around Iran’s nuclear sites.49 The Bushehr
nuclear reactor which Russia is building in Iran and was exempted from the sanctions is
an $800 million project.50 In addition, during the week prior to the passage of Resolution
1737, China’s national oil corporation signed a $16 billion agreement to develop Iranian
gas fields.51
In the months since passage of Resolution 1737, Russia and China have
consistently worked to both delay and water down additional sanctions. The European
Union has played a more constructive role, both at the Security Council and in imposing
EU sanctions that are somewhat broader than those imposed by the Council. However,
the EU could do much more. If the EU, which supplies one-third of Iran’s imports
(including a high proportion of Iran’s sophisticated machinery needs),52 were to follow
the US lead and impose a nearly comprehensive embargo on Iran, it might quickly
succeed in coercing Iran to cease its nuclear weapons program. But there is no sign that
the EU plans to impose such vigorous additional sanctions against Iran.

V.

How S. 970 Can Help Prevent Iran from Acquiring Nuclear Weapons

S. 970 can contribute to increasing leverage over Iran and thus improving the
prospects for preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. S. 970 would tighten
U.S. sanctions against Iran. S. 970 would also encourage other countries and businesses
to tighten their sanctions against Iran. Sanctions, including S. 970, are not a substitute for
diplomacy. Rather, they are a tool to increase leverage over Iran in a situation where the
leverage is currently clearly insufficient to convince Iran to step back from the nuclear
brink. There are two types of leverage in international relations: carrots and sticks. In
June 2006, the so-called “Permanent Five Plus 1” (the U.S., Russia, China, France,
Britain, and Germany) offered Iran a generous package of incentives if it were to
permanently and verifiably curb its nuclear program.53 Security Council Resolution 1803
of March 2008 confirmed that the June 2006 offer still stands. In conjunction with the
June 2006 offer, Iran was also reportedly threatened with various sanctions if it did not
agree to curb its nuclear program.54 Despite Iran’s failure to negotiate seriously and
notwithstanding Iran’s persistence with its nuclear program in defiance of international
48

Russian Anti-aircraft Weapons Sales to Syria, Iran on Schedule, AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, Jan. 2, 2007.
Id.
50
Colum Lynch, Sanctions on Iran Approved by U.N., WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2006, at A1.
51
R. Nicholas Burns, Under Sec’y for Political Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, Conference Call on UN Sanctions
Resolution 1737 (Dec. 23, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2006/ 78246.htm
52
European Commission Bilateral Trade Relations: Iran,
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/iran/index_en.htm.
53
See, e.g., Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report For Congress: Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, Jan. 30, 2008, at
20.
54
Id.
49

9

law, few of those threatened sanctions have thus far been imposed on Iran. While the
incentive package may need to be revisited in light of subsequent developments,
negotiators with Iran will need to keep in mind the moral hazard risk of rewarding Iran
for complying with its international legal obligations. For this reason, and in light of the
apparently high value to Iran of its nuclear program, an increase in leverage over Iran will
inevitably need to include a dramatic strengthening of the sanctions currently imposed on
Iran.
In light of Iran’s advancing nuclear program, a failure by the West to quickly
improve its peaceful leverage over Iran will inevitably leave us with a terrible choice:
taking military action to stop Iran’s nuclear weapons program or allowing Iran to obtain a
nuclear arsenal.
S. 970 would not likely in and of itself bring an end to Iran’s nuclear program. It
is impossible to know what measure would be the tipping point that would convince
Iran’s regime that the price for its nuclear program has become too high, that the risk
from sanctions to the regime’s survival has become so great that the regime is better
served by halting its nuclear program rather than further risking its grip over the Iranian
people. In light of the gravity of the danger posed to the United States by the Iranian
threat, we must take every possible economic, political and diplomatic measure that
might reasonably contribute towards reaching that tipping point. Passage of S. 970 will
immediately move us closer to achieving that tipping point. By providing an example to
the rest of the world, S. 970 will also likely encourage others to soon contribute towards
achieving that tipping point.
As I mentioned earlier, Russia, with its Security Council veto, has been a key
obstacle to imposing strong sanctions on Iran. S. 970 would send Russia a strong
message that it cannot both shield Iran and conduct business as usual with the United
States. In doing so, S. 970 would remind Russia of the several benefits it would receive,
or more likely receive, from the United States were it to play a more constructive role in
stopping Iran’s nuclear program. These benefits include U.S. support for Russian
accession to the World Trade Organization and conclusion of a 123 agreement for civil
nuclear cooperation between the United States and Russia. However, in light of
developments regarding Bushehr, including the spent fuel return arrangement, the
language of S. 970 should be revised to reflect that the foremost Russian obstacle to
stopping Iran’s nuclear program is Moscow’s blocking of strong sanctions in the Security
Council. Revision of these provisions would enable the Administration to more usefully
deploy them as leverage in diplomatic negotiations with Russia.
S. 970 also includes several provisions that address direct U.S. sanctions against
Iran. For example, S. 970 includes a sense of Congress provision encouraging
administrators of federal and state pension plans to divest all assets or holdings from
foreign companies and entities that have invested or invest in the future in Iran’s energy
sector. S. 970 would also require the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board to
report on any investment in entities that invest in Iran. I would like to see these
provisions strengthened. As a former federal employee who still has considerable
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pension funds invested with the federal thrift savings plan, I am appalled that my pension
may be invested in companies that do business with Iran. Divestment of federal pension
funds from such companies could be accomplished by incorporating in this bill language
akin to that in H.R. 1357.
I would also encourage amending S. 970 so as to incorporate language -- akin to
that in the Iran Sanctions Enabling Act (H.R. 2347) which has passed the House and is
pending in the Senate -- that would authorize and facilitate state and local pension fund
divestment from certain foreign companies doing business in Iran. State and local
pension fund divestment can contribute significantly to discouraging foreign companies
from investing in Iran. The threatened withdrawal from such companies of billions of
dollars of state and local pension fund investment provides such companies with a strong
incentive to withdraw from the Iranian market. Florida, California, Illinois, and New
Jersey, among others, have already passed legislation to divest their state’s pension funds
from foreign companies doing business with Iran. Passage by Congress of Iran
divestment enabling legislation would encourage more states to take that positive step.
S. 970 would also usefully close most of the remaining exceptions to United
States imports from and exports to Iran. In 2006, the U.S. imported from Iran $157
million worth of goods including pomegranate juice, pistachio nuts, and caviar, and
exported to Iran $85 million worth of goods including tobacco products.55 President
Clinton had in 1995 banned all U.S. trade with Iran.56 However, the U.S. had in 1999 and
2000, in a gesture to the relatively moderate Iranian President Khatemi, eased the trade
ban to allow U.S. commercial sales of food to Iran and exports from Iran to the U.S. of
Iranian nuts, dried fruits, carpets and caviar.57 In light of the radical nature of the current
Iranian regime, it is past time to re-close most of the remaining exceptions to United
States trade with Iran.
Some will argue that S. 970 is wrong because it is unilateral, or because it runs
afoul of our international trade commitments, or because it will have an inappropriate
humanitarian impact. None of these is correct.
The weak multilateral sanctions imposed thus far on Iran by the United Nations
Security Council are simply not up to the task of slowing Iran’s nuclear program. Nor is
there the prospect of sufficiently stronger U.N. or other multilateral sanctions if things
proceed as at present. Each of the three binding Security Council resolutions in response
to Iran’s nuclear program has requested a report from the IAEA Director General on
whether Iran has complied. The resolutions have also stated that in the event that the
report shows Iran has not complied, the Council will “adopt further appropriate measures
. . . to persuade Iran to comply.” The idea has been to slowly ramp up the pressure on
Iran. This race between Iran’s advancing nuclear program and tightening Security
Council sanctions is a race Iran is clearly winning. Even in the face of Iran’s explicit
defiance, the resolutions have been too slow in coming and each has added incrementally
55
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less tightening than the one before. The net result thus far is sanctions far weaker than
those which stopped the Iraqi and Libyan nuclear weapons programs. Indeed, the Iran
sanctions are thus far weaker than the sanctions imposed by the Security Council on
South Africa in response to apartheid, on Liberia and Cote D’Ivoire during their civil
wars, Sierra Leone in response to its May 1997 military coup, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia during the Bosnian crisis, and Haiti in response to its 1991 military coup.
Were Liberia, Cote D’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Haiti greater threats to international
peace and security than Iran is today? No, there was simply less profit to be made from
those countries than there is to be made from Iran today. That calculus is not going to
change unless we make it change, unless we make it clear to foreign countries and
companies that the profits to be made in Iran from continuing to do business with Iran
will be dwarfed by the profits they will lose in the United States from continuing to do
business with Iran. We cannot allow our national security to be held hostage to the
lowest common denominator of the United Nations Security Council. S. 970 would help
return our fate to our own hands.
The U.S.’s recent successes with unilateral banking sanctions, about which the
Committee heard from Under Secretary Levey just last week, show that unilateral
sanctions can be very effective in both directly impacting the target country and
persuading third countries to lessen their ties to the target country. S. 970 would help
build on those successes.
S. 970 would not run afoul of our international trade commitments. Article XXI
(“Security Exceptions”) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) states:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
...
(b)

to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests
(i)

relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are
derived;

(ii)

relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and
to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or
indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment;

(iii)

taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or .
..

U.S. actions, such as those in S. 970, which would be taken to protect our
essential security interests from Iran’s fissionable material program, which is clearly an
emergency threat to international peace and security, fall well within the exceptions
provided by Article XXI of the GATT. As the Committee knows, the U.S. and EU made
certain political commitments to each other in 1998 in an effort to resolve a dispute over
the reach of the Helms-Burton and Iran Libya Sanctions Acts, and especially the former.
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Any decision by the Administration to impose sanctions on European entities pursuant to
the Iran Sanctions Act will, as a diplomatic matter, need to take those understandings into
account. But neither passage of S. 970 nor the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the
Iran Sanctions Act would violate U.S. legal obligations under the GATT.
With respect to the allegation that S. 970 might harm humanitarian interests, I am
frankly puzzled. Neither current U.N. nor current U.S. sanctions deprive Iran of either
food or medicine. Neither will S. 970 deprive Iran of either food or medicine. Section 7
of S. 970, which would re-close most of the exceptions to the U.S. trade embargo on Iran,
explicitly exempts “exports to Iran of food and medicine.” If the people of Iran are not
as prosperous today as they would like to be, it is because the Iranian regime has
mismanaged the Iranian economy and chosen to isolate itself from the international
community by persisting in its nuclear program in explicit defiance of three legallybinding U.N. Security Council Resolutions. Whatever inconvenience the Iranian people
might incur from a tightening of sanctions attributable to S. 970 would pale in
comparison to the humanitarian costs to the United States and its allies of an Iranian
nuclear arsenal, including the greatly increased risk of stepped-up terrorism under an
Iranian nuclear umbrella, a likely cascade of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East
tinderbox, and the greatly increased risk of a nuclear 9/11 – costing more than half a
million American lives per detonated nuclear weapon.

VI.

Conclusion

Iran’s nuclear program is a grave threat to U.S. national and economic security.
The international community has thus far responded with remarkable passivity to Iran’s
dangerous insistence on developing its nuclear capabilities in explicit violation of three
mandatory U.N. Security Council resolutions. As a result, there is at present nothing but
time standing between the Iranian regime and a nuclear arsenal. The international
community presently has insufficient leverage to persuade Iran to halt its nuclear
program.
In light of Iran’s advancing nuclear program, a failure to exert American
leadership in quickly improving our leverage over Iran will inevitably leave us with a
terrible choice: taking military action to stop Iran’s nuclear weapons program or allowing
Iran to obtain a nuclear arsenal. In light of the gravity of the danger posed to the United
States by that Iranian threat, we must take every possible economic, political and
diplomatic measure to convince Iran’s regime that the price for its nuclear program has
become too high, that the risk from sanctions to the regime’s survival has become so
great that the regime is better served by halting its nuclear program rather than further
risking its grip over the Iranian people.
S. 970 can contribute to increasing leverage over Iran and thus improving the
prospects for preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. S. 970 would tighten
U.S. sanctions against Iran. S. 970 would also encourage other countries and businesses
to tighten their sanctions against Iran.
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Stronger U.S. sanctions on Iran would impose costs on U.S. business. Stronger
multilateral sanctions would impose costs on Russia, China, Europe and other
sanctioning countries. But sanctions are investments in protecting against the far higher
price of a nuclear 9/11 – more than half a million lives and over $1 trillion in economic
cost per nuclear bomb detonated in a U.S. city.
Thank you.
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